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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past decade the United States Supreme Court has reinter-
preted the scope of the writ of habeas corpus.' As a result, prior to
reaching the substantive merits of a habeas petition, federal courts must
1. A writ of habeas corpus is a form of collateral attack that permits a prisoner to challenge a
conviction on constitutional grounds in federal court. The writ does not relate to the prisoner's
guilt or innocence, but questions whether the prisoner's liberty is restrained in violation of the
federal Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) (creating habeas relief for state court
convictions); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988) (creating habeas relief for federal court convictions).
The writ of federal habeas corpus ... is the principal exception to the general rule
that state prisoners have no meaningful access to a federal forum for the litigation of
federal constitutional claims. The writ authorizes lower federal courts to examine
state court judgments collaterally. A state prisoner must first file a petition raising
the constitutional errors that allegedly tainted the state processes leading to his or
her conviction and sentence before "the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the
district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions." 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (1988). In actuality the great weight of habeas practice is before the federal
district courts, an arrangement that channels the bulk of federal examination of
constitutional errors in state criminal processes into those courts. See generally
PAUL M. BATOR E-r AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 50-56 (3d ed. 1988). Upon the filing of a petition, the district
court must, in a great many instances, hold an evidentiary hearing on the claims, if
they are substantial. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988). After disposition of the petition
in the district court, either the petitioner or the state is entitled to appeal to the
federal circuit court. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1988).
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employ several doctrines that test whether the petitioner complied with
state and federal procedures for raising the claim at trial, on appeal, or
on collateral review. This Comment focuses on the Court's redefinition
of the abuse of the writ doctrine, which narrows a habeas petitioner's
opportunity to have his claims reviewed on their merits.' The Court
recently reached its most limiting definition of abuse of the writ in Saw-
yer v. Whitley.3 Sawyer deals with abuse of the writ in the context of
innocence of death. That is, the petitioner does not argue that he is inno-
cent of the crime; rather, he argues that he is innocent of the death pen-
alty itself.
In 1991, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld on collateral
review the death sentence of Robert Wayne Sawyer for the murder of his
house guest.' The case went to the United States Supreme Court, where
the Court delineated the circumstances that preclude federal court
review of a second or later habeas petition that raises grounds for relief
not raised in a prior petition because it is an "abuse of the writ."5 The
Court held that unless the petitioner shows he is actually innocent of his
death sentence, a federal court may not reach the merits of the claim in a
subsequent, abusive petition.6 The Court explained that "to show 'actual
innocence' one must show by clear and convincing evidence that but for
a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the peti-
tioner eligible for the death penalty under the applicable state law."7
Under this standard, as long as the sentencer finds at least one statutory
aggravating factor, the petitioner is eligible for the death penalty and
Julia E. Boaz, Note, Summary Processes and the Rule of Law: Expediting Death Penalty Cases in
the Federal Courts, 95 YALE L.J. 349, 349 n.1 (1985) (some citations omitted, others updated).
2. "No other single issue.., has occupied so much of the Court's time or generated so many
opinions during the last two decades [as capital punishment]." J. Mark Lane, "Is There Life
Without Parole?": A Capital Defendant's Right to a Meaningful Alternative Sentence, 26 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 327, 329 n.15 (1993). To remain manageable and understandable, this Comment
focuses narrowly on the abuse of the writ doctrine. Therefore, a complete discussion of the many
other doctrines the United States Supreme Court has used to narrow substantive review of habeas
petitions in capital cases, including, for example, harmless error and retroactivity, is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
3. 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
4. Sawyer v. Whitley, 945 F.2d 812, 825 (5th Cir. 1991). The State of Louisiana executed
Robert Wayne Sawyer by lethal injection on March 5, 1993. He was the 194th person executed
since the United States Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in 1976. Death Row, U.S.A.,
(NAACP Legal Def. Fund & Educ. Fund, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Spring 1993, at 1, 8; see infra
text accompanying notes 9-14. Currently, thirty-six states authorize the death penalty. Death
Row, U.S.A., supra, at 1. For a listing of those states, see infra notes 73, 77.
5. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2518.
6. Id. at 2517. This same standard applies to successive and procedurally defaulted claims.
Id.
7. Id. at 2517. Actual innocence in the penalty phase is synonymous with innocence of
death. Compare Justice Rehnquist's use of "actually innocent" with Justice Stevens's use of
"innocent of death." Id. at 2517, 2531.
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therefore ineligible for federal court review of his claim.8
Sawyer is the latest in a series of Supreme Court cases interpreting
death penalty jurisprudence. Before 1972, many states authorized the
death penalty for any defendant found guilty of murder.9 Sentencing
authorities or juries had unfettered discretion to impose the death pen-
alty.'" In 1972, the Supreme Court held in Furman v. Georgia1' that
unguided sentencing in imposing the death penalty violated the
Constitution.
Later cases, however, allowed and encouraged "guided discretion"
in the sentencing process.12 In Gregg v. Georgia,3 the Court held that
imposition of the death penalty did not violate the Constitution if at least
one statutory aggravating circumstance existed. 4 Further, in two 1983
cases, Barclay v. Florida5 and Zant v. Stephens, 6 the Court found no
constitutional defect in allowing a sentencing authority to consider non-
statutory aggravating circumstances after it finds at least one statutory
aggravating factor.' 7 Thus, the difference in death sentences pre-
8. A typical state death penalty statute bifurcates the guilt determination and sentencing
proceeding. See Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 SuP. CT. REV. 305, 309. First, the
jury finds the defendant guilty or not guilty; this portion of the trial is called the guilt phase. If the
jury finds the defendant guilty, the court holds a second proceeding to sentence the defendant; this
portion of the trial is called the penalty phase. In the penalty phase, the sentencing authority looks
at statutorily established aggravating factors to decide whether the death sentence is an appropriate
punishment for this defendant. See generally Weisberg, supra. Twenty-seven states that
authorize the death penalty provide for jury sentencing in the penalty phase. Stephen Gillers,
Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 14 n.49 (1980). A minority of states, however, permit
the judge to be the sentencing authority or to override an advisory jury's recommendation.
Gillers, supra, at 14. Typical statutory aggravating factors include the following: the victim was
a peace officer, or under the age of twelve; the defendant committed the murder during the
performance of an enumerated felony; or the defendant committed the murder for money. See
infra notes 73, 77; Gillers, supra, at 13 n.48.
9. Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1179 (1 1th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 361
(1992); Weisberg, supra note 8, at 309 n.14.
10. Johnson, 938 F.2d at 1179; Weisberg, supra note 8, at 309.
11. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
12. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (holding that the Constitution requires states to give
a sentencing authority discretion to consider both statutory and non-statutory mitigating factors);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (holding mandatory death penalty statute
unconstitutional); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (holding mandatory death
penalty statute unconstitutional); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding guided
discretion statute that includes, inter alia, future dangerousness as an aggravating circumstance);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding guided discretion statute requiring
establishment of specific aggravating circumstances followed by a balancing of aggravating and
mitigating circumstances); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding guided discretion
statute requiring establishment of specific aggravating circumstances).
13. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
14. Id. at 206. For an explanation of statutory aggravating factors, see supra note 8.
15. 463 U.S. 939 (1983).
16. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
17. Barclay, 463 U.S. at 957; Stephens, 462 U.S. at 876 n.14, 878.
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Furman and post-Barclay is that Barclay grants a sentencing authority
the same discretion struck down in Furman, provided it first finds at
least one statutory aggravating factor.' 8 In addition, the Court has man-
dated that the sentencing authority be allowed to consider relevant miti-
gating evidence, both statutory and nonstatutory. 19 Accordingly, "when
the prosecution has proved that the defendant committed aggravated
murder, the sentencing authority has very broad discretion to sentence
the defendant either to life imprisonment or the death penalty."2 Once
the sentencing authority imposes the death sentence and the defendant
exhausts his direct appeals in state court, the defendant likely will peti-
tion a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. At that time, various
procedural bars may come into play.
Part II of this Comment explains what makes a claim abusive. Part
III explains how the two exceptions to the doctrinal bar against abusive
claims arose and what they have come to mean. These exceptions are
cause and prejudice and actual innocence. Actual innocence may be fur-
ther divided into actual innocence of the underlying crime and actual
innocence of the death penalty. Innocence of death, as is used later in
this Comment, refers only to actual innocence of the death penalty. Part
IV discusses the split between the Circuit Courts of Appeals over the
interpretation of innocence of death and lays out both the test the
Supreme Court rejected in Sawyer v. Whitley and the test the Supreme
Court explicitly approved. Part V analyzes Sawyer, first discussing the
factual and procedural background. Part V then dissects the majority
and both concurring opinions, discussing the standard of proof adopted
by each, the factors demonstrating guilt or innocence that each opinion
is willing to consider, and the policy considerations driving the deci-
sions. Finally, Part VI advocates a return to the fundamental miscar-
riage of justice exception apart from the factual inquiry into actual
innocence of the death penalty.
II. ABUSE OF THE WRIT
The doctrine of abuse of the writ applies when a petitioner presents
a claim for the first time in a second or subsequent petition for a writ of
18. For a detailed discussion of the United States Supreme Court's "legal doctrine-making" in
capital cases, see Weisberg, supra note 8, at 306 (describing the "art of legal doctrine-making [as
being] in a state of nervous breakdown."). For a concise discussion of this movement in the law
of death penalty cases, see Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1179-81 (11 th Cir. 1991), cert
denied, 113 S. Ct. 361 (1992).
19. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 394 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4
(1986); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978).
20. Johnson, 938 F.2d at 1181. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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habeas corpus.2  In Sanders v. United States,2 2 the Court clarified the
abuse of the writ doctrine, which Congress then codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 Rule 9(b):
A second or successive petition may be dismissed if the judge finds
that it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior
determination was on the merits or, if new and different grounds are
alleged, the judge finds that the failure of the petitioner to assert
those grounds in a prior petition constituted an abuse of the writ.23
Abusive claims hinder finality in criminal proceedings because petition-
ers bring claims in a piecemeal fashion. To combat this, the abuse of the
writ doctrine requires petitioners to include all of their claims in a single
habeas petition in the federal district court.24 The doctrine bars review
of claims omitted both by deliberate choice and by inexcusable
neglect.25 Nevertheless, even though a prisoner files a petition with an
abusive claim, the federal court may review this claim on the merits if
the petitioner shows cause for the omission and prejudice from the
alleged error26 or actual innocence of either the crime or the penalty.27
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE ABUSE OF THE WRIT DOCTRINE
Three types of claims require the petitioner to show either cause
21. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 1457 (1991).
When a prisoner files a second or subsequent application, the government bears the
burden of pleading abuse of the writ. The government satisfies this burden if, with
clarity and particularity, it notes petitioner's prior writ history, identifies the claims
that appear for the first time, and alleges that petitioner has abused the writ. The
burden to disprove abuse then becomes petitioner's.
Id. at 1470.
22. 373 U.S. 1, 11-19 (1963). In Sanders, the Court clarified the abuse of the writ doctrine
that had begun to emerge in Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924) and Price v.
Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 287-93 (1948).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
24. See McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1469 (noting that "[plerpetual disrespect for the finality of
convictions disparages the entire criminal justice system"); Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377,
380 (1984) (stating that "[a] pattern seems to be developing in capital cases of multiple review in
which claims that could have been presented years ago are brought forward-often in a piecemeal
fashion--only after the execution date is set or becomes imminent. Federal courts should not
continue to tolerate--even in capital cases-this type of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus.");
Sanders, 373 U.S. at 18 (holding that whether the claims were "deliberately withheld" or
"deliberately abandoned," the petitioner "may be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing on
a second application presenting the withheld [or abandoned] ground.... Nothing in the traditions
of habeas corpus requires the federal courts to tolerate needless, piecemeal litigation, or to
entertain collateral proceedings whose only purpose is to vex, harass, or delay."). A new claim in
a subsequent petition should not be entertained if the judge finds the failure to raise it earlier
"inexcusable." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9 advisory committee's note.
25. McCleskey, 111 S. Ct. at 1468.
26. Id. at 1470 (applying cause and prejudice standard of Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72
(1977)).
27. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2517 (1992).
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and prejudice or actual innocence before the federal court can reach the
merits of the claim: (a) successive claims raising grounds identical to
those heard and decided on the merits in a previous petition, (b) claims
not previously raised which constitute an abuse of the writ, or (c) proce-
durally defaulted claims in which the petitioner failed to follow applica-
ble state procedural rules in raising the claims.28
A. Cause and Prejudice
When the petitioner's claim is successive, abusive, or procedurally
defaulted, the federal court first determines whether the petitioner satis-
fies the cause and prejudice exception. Because this exception took
form in state procedural default cases, explaining its growth and impli-
cations requires briefly discussing the state procedural default doctrine.29
The state procedural default doctrine impels petitioners to seek
relief in accordance with state procedures before bringing the claim to
federal court.3" This doctrine reflects concerns similar to those behind
the abuse of the writ doctrine: 31 federal collateral review strains scarce
federal judicial resources and Shifts resources away from primary dis-
pute resolution.32  Accordingly, in McCleskey v. Zant the Court con-
cluded "from the unity of the structure and purpose [between state
28. Id. at 2518.
29. The cause and prejudice exception originated in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233
(1973). In Davis, a federal prisoner collaterally attacked his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Id.
at 235-36. The Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(2), which
applies to federal defendants, barred habeas relief because Davis had procedurally defaulted his
claim of an unconstitutional grand jury selection by not raising it before trial and by not showing
cause for the default as Rule 12(b)(2) required. Id. at 242. The Court in Davis further required
the defendant to show that he had been actually prejudiced by the constitutional violation he
alleged. Id. at 244-45.
The Supreme Court next applied the cause and prejudice standard to a Louisiana defendant
who collaterally attacked his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S.
536, 538 (1976). Similar to Davis, the defendant in Francis sought to show that members of his
race had been unconstitutionally excluded from his grand jury. Although the Louisiana statute
examined in Francis did not permit the defendant to show cause for his failure to raise the claim
prior to trial, the Court still applied the cause and prejudice exception. Id. at 537-38. Again, just
as the Court in Davis had done, the Francis Court found no showing that the defendant had been
actually prejudiced. Id. at 542.
30. See, e.g., Presnell v. Kemp, 835 F.2d 1567, 1578-79 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (citing Ex parte
Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1050 (1989).
31. McCleskey v. Zant, 11l S. Ct. 1454, 1469-70 (1991).
Both doctrines impose on petitioners a burden of reasonable compliance with
procedures designed to discourage baseless claims and to keep the system open for
valid ones; both recognize the law's interest in finality; and both invoke equitable
principles to define the court's discretion to excuse pleading and procedural
requirements for petitioners who could not comply with them in the exercise of
reasonable care and diligence.
Id.
32. Id. at 1469 (noting that federal collateral review "places a heavy burden on scarce federal
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procedural default and abuse of the writ] that the standard for excusing a
failure to raise a claim at the appropriate time should be the same in both
contexts. '33 Therefore, the federal courts must first attempt to establish
the existence of cause and prejudice to excuse either a state procedural
default or, in the case of an abuse of the writ, neglect or omission.34
In Wainwright v. Sykes,35 the Court first extended the cause and
prejudice exception to federal writs of habeas corpus. Sykes left the pre-
cise definition of cause and prejudice to be resolved in future cases. 36
Later, the Court determined that cause, though still not precisely
defined, requires a petitioner to show that some external impediment
prevented his counsel from devising or advancing the defaulted claim.37
In addition, prejudice denotes a reasonable probability that the constitu-
tional defect altered the result of the petitioner's trial.38 Nonetheless,
inability to prove cause or prejudice does not end the inquiry. "[I1n an
extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably
resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal
habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of
cause for the procedural default." 39  The federal court first looks for
cause and prejudice. Only in the absence of one of these prongs must
the court inquire into the petitioner's actual innocence.
B. Actual Innocence
The Supreme Court first considered the concept of actual innocence
judicial resources, and threatens the capacity of the system to resolve primary disputes.") (citation
omitted).
33. Id. at 1470.
34. Id. (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 88 (1977)).
35. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
36. Id. at 87. The Court did, however, reject the standard set forth in dicta in Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391 (1962), "which would make federal habeas review generally available to state convicts
absent a knowing and deliberate waiver of the federal constitutional contention." Id. at 87-88.
37. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986) (stating that the cause and prejudice
exception "ordinarily requires a showing of some external impediment preventing counsel from
constructing or raising the [defaulted] claim").
38. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538-39 (1986) (stating that the alleged error must
undermine the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing determination to constitute prejudice); United
States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-72 (1982) (holding that petitioner must show that the errors at
his trial "worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of
constitutional dimensions." In Frady, the Court found no substantial likelihood that but for the
error, petitioner would have been convicted of a lesser crime.).
39. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496 (emphasis added). The Court further stated that "'[iln
appropriate cases,' the principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts of cause and
prejudice 'must yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration."' Id. at
495 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)). In Frady, the Court stated that a
petitioner may be granted relief if, in collaterally attacking his conviction, the petitioner offered
affirmative evidence indicating he was wrongly convicted of a crime of which he was innocent.
Frady, 456 U.S. at 171.
1993]
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in Murray v. Carrier.40 Clifford Carrier had been convicted of rape and
abduction. 4' After the conviction, Carrier's attorney filed an appeal that
neglected to address the trial court's refusal to allow defense counsel to
examine statements made by the victim. 42 Upon the state court's dis-
missal, Carrier filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal
court. He argued that his state procedural default resulted from his attor-
ney's mistaken omission and thus should not bar review of his claim.43
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, first affirmed the Court's
confidence that, for the most part, persons suffering a fundamental mis-
carriage of justice will be able to show both cause and prejudice."4
O'Connor then noted that if a petitioner could not show cause and preju-
dice, proof of his probable actual innocence would suffice to permit
habeas review.45
In Smith v. Murray,46 a case of state procedural default, the
Supreme Court imported into the penalty phase of capital punishment
cases the actual innocence standard that had originated as dictum in Car-
rier.47 The Court acknowledged "that the concept of 'actual' as opposed
to 'legal' innocence does not translate easily into the context of an
alleged error at the sentencing phase of a [capital] trial."48 In denying
the petitioner relief, the Court reaffirmed that the actual innocence stan-
dard seeks to avoid fundamental miscarriages of justice. The Court
explained that where "the alleged constitutional error neither precluded
the development of true facts nor resulted in the admission of false ones
..., refusal to consider the defaulted claim on federal habeas [does not]
carr[y] with it the risk of a manifest miscarriage of justice."49 In short,
the Court translated actual innocence into factual innocence. Thus, the
Court no longer asks whether a petitioner's constitutional rights were
violated to his prejudice; instead, it asks whether the alleged constitu-
tional violation "undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing
40. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
41. Id. at 482.
42. Id..
43. Id. at 483.
44. Id. at 495-96 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)).
45. Id. at 496 (stating that "in an extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has
probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may
grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default.") (emphasis
added).
46. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
47. Id. at 537. The defendant in Smith v. Murray had procedurally defaulted his claim by
failing to press it before the Virginia Supreme Court on direct appeal. Id. at 529.
48. Id. at 537.
49. Id. at 538.
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determination."5 Moreover, the Court equated the concept of "miscar-
riage of justice," which properly is a procedural question concerned with
protection of constitutional rights, with the concept of "actual inno-
cence," which is a fact-based inquiry into the petitioner's guilt or inno-
cence. 5 The two concepts, however, are distinct. Actual innocence is
only a subset of the larger category of potential abuses constituting fun-
damental miscarriages of justice.
Because the Supreme Court now equates actual innocence with
fundamental miscarriages of justice,52 the Court no longer finds a funda-
mental miscarriage of justice in the admission of prejudicial evidence
that is both probative and reliable. That is, as long as the result achieved
is "proper," it is irrelevant whether the procedure was improper. The
Court affirmed this position in Dugger v. Adams,53 McCleskey,54 and
Sawyer.-5 The Court has eviscerated a procedural safeguard by reducing
it to a factual inquiry; this approach, however, has only engendered
more confusion.
Innocent of death is a paradox. Innocent means guiltless. It is
illogical to concede that a person is guilty of a capital crime and yet
conclude that he is innocent of the penalty authorized for that crime.
Although a petitioner who maintains he is innocent of the death penalty
asks for the same relief as one who claims he suffered a fundamental
miscarriage of justice, the argument is distinct. The petitioner arguing
his innocence of death does not argue (and is not permitted to argue) that
because of a procedural error he deserves a second chance at sentencing.
In effect, he argues that because the sentencing process was tainted, he is
untainted. Because the process was unfair, he-though confessedly
guilty of the crime-is innocent of the penalty. Because the Supreme
50. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2526 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. at 539).
51. Id. at 2526 (citation omitted).
52. Indeed, Justice Rehnquist treats the phrases "miscarriage of justice" and "actual
innocence" as synonymous. Id. at 2518-19.
53. 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
Demonstrating that an error is by its nature the kind of error that might have
affected the accuracy of a death sentence is far from demonstrating that an
individual defendant probably is "actually innocent" of the sentence he or she
received. [To hold otherwise] would turn the case in which an error results in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice, the "extraordinary case," into an all too ordinary
one.
Id. at 410 n.6 (citations omitted).
54. McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991). The Court noted that the Constitutional
violation, if one existed, "resulted in the admission at trial of truthful inculpatory evidence which
did not affect the reliability of the guilt determination. . . . [Therefore, petitioner] cannot
demonstrate that the alleged [constitutional] violation caused the conviction of an innocent
person." Id. at 1474-75 (citation omitted).
55. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2515, 2519.
19931
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Court has allowed petitioners to argue that they are simultaneously
guilty and innocent, the lower federal courts predictably have diverged
in their interpretations of what it means to be innocent of death.
IV. SPLIT AMONG THE COURTS OF APPEALS
The courts of appeals split regarding what innocent of the death
penalty actually means. 6 The Eighth and Ninth Circuits developed a
balancing test to determine whether the sentencer more probably than
not would have sentenced the defendant to life imprisonment instead of
death.57 By contrast, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits construed actual
innocence to denote ineligibility for the death penalty. 8 The distinction
between the two approaches may be characterized as follows: the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits ask whether the petitioner would not have
been sentenced to death absent the alleged constitutional error; the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits ask whether the petitioner could not have been
sentenced to death.59 The Supreme Court in Sawyer explicitly espoused
the eligibility approach of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits.
In Deutscher v. Whitley,6" the Ninth Circuit articulated the test later
rejected by the Supreme Court:6 to establish his innocence of death, a
defendant must establish that constitutional error substantially under-
mined the accuracy of the capital sentencing determination.62 That is,
the error in question must have been of such magnitude that it is "more
probable than not that, but for the constitutional error, the sentence of
death would not have been imposed."63 The Eighth Circuit adopted a
similar test.
In Smith v. Armontrout,6 the Eighth Circuit required a determina-
tion that the constitutional error probably caused the sentencing author-
ity to sentence the defendant to death when it otherwise would have
56. Various Supreme Court Justices use the phrases "actually innocent of the death penalty"
and "innocent of death" interchangeably. See supra note 7. To avoid confusion, this Comment
uses the phrase "innocent of death."
57. See Deutscher v. Whitley, 946 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub nom.
Deutscher v. Hatcher, 113 S. Ct. 374 (1992); Stokes v. Armontrout, 893 F.2d 152, 156 (8th Cir.
1989); Smith v. Armontrout, 888 F.2d 530, 545 (8th Cir. 1989).
58. Sawyer v. Whitley, 945 F.2d 812, 820 (5th Cir. 1991), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992);
Johnson v. Singletary, 938 F.2d 1166, 1183 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 361 (1992).
59. See Deutscher, 946 F.2d at 1444-45.
60. 946 F.2d 1443 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub noma. Deutscher v. Hatcher, 113 S. Ct. 374
(1992).
61. Even Justice Stevens rejected the Ninth Circuit's approach in favor of one more
restrictive. See Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2538 (Stevens, J., concurring).
62. Deutscher, 946 F.2d at 1446.
63. Id.
64. 888 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1989).
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sentenced him to life imprisonment.65 Under this approach, if a reason-
able juror probably would have found that the mitigating factors out-
weighed the aggravating factors, then the petitioner may have suffered a
fundamental miscarriage of justice and would be entitled to federal court
review of his claims. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits's approach focused
more on avoidance of miscarriages of justice than on the defendant's
actual innocence; these circuits emphasized correct procedure instead of
factual innocence.
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits use a more restrictive approach. In
construing actual innocence of the death penalty, or innocence of death,
the Fifth Circuit asks whether the sentencer has established the neces-
sary facts required by state or federal law to impose the death penalty.66
The Fifth Circuit looks only to the presence of statutory aggravating
factors, giving no consideration to mitigators of any kind.67 If one statu-
tory aggravating factor68 exists, then the petitioner is eligible for the
65. Id. at 545 (holding that "[i]n the penalty-phase context, this exception [actual innocence]
will be available if the federal constitutional error alleged probably resulted in a verdict of death
against one whom the jury would otherwise have sentenced to life imprisonment.").
66. Sawyer v. Whitley, 945 F.2d 812, 820 (5th Cir. 1991), afd, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
67. Although the federal court reviewing an abusive claim may ignore the mitigators, the
original sentencer must be allowed to consider them. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 394
(1987); see also supra text accompanying note 19.
68. Aggravating circumstances under the Louisiana law applied to Sawyer include:
(1) The offender was engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of
aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary,
aggravated arson, aggravated escape, armed robbery, first degree robbery, or simple
robbery. (2) The victim was a fireman or peace officer engaged in his lawful duties.
(3) The offender has been previously convicted of an unrelated murder, aggravated
rape, aggravated burglary, aggravated arson, aggravated escape, armed robbery, or
aggravated kidnapping. (4) The offender knowingly created a risk of death or great.
bodily harm to more than one person. (5) The offender offered or has been offered
or has given or received anything of value for the commission of the offense. (6)
The offender at the time of the commission of the offense was imprisoned after
sentence for the commission of an unrelated forcible felony. (7) The offense was
committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner [i.e., the victim was
subjected to "serious physical abuse.., before death." State v. Sonnier, 402 So. 2d
650, 659 (La. 1981)]. (8) The victim was a witness in a prosecution against the
defendant, gave material assistance to the state in any investigation or prosecution
of the defendant, or was an eye witness to a crime alleged to have been committed
by the defendant or possessed other material evidence against the defendant. (9)
The victim was a correctional officer or any employee of the Department of Public
Safety and Corrections who, in the normal course of his employment was required
to come in close contact with persons incarcerated in a state prison facility, and the
victim was engaged in his lawful duties at the time of the offense. (10) The victim
was under the age of twelve years. (11) The offender was engaged in the
distribution, exchange, sale, or purchase, or any attempt thereof, of a controlled
dangerous substance ....
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4 (West 1992).
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death penalty; this eligibility forecloses federal review of the abusive
habeas petition.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Johnson v. Singletary69 set out an
eligibility-based test to determine innocence of death. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that
a petitioner may make a colorable showing that he is actually inno-
cent of the death penalty by presenting evidence that an alleged con-
stitutional error implicates all of the aggravating factors found to be
present by the sentencing body. That is, but for the alleged constitu-
tional error, the sentencing body could not have found any aggravat-
ing factors and thus the petitioner was ineligible for the death penalty.
In other words, the petitioner must show that absent the alleged con-
stitutional error, the jury would have lacked the discretion to impose
the death penalty; that is, that he is ineligible for the death penalty. 70
The Supreme Court adopted this eligibility approach in Sawyer.7'
The Court held that the petitioner must show that "but for a constitu-
tional error, no reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible
for the death penalty under the applicable state law."72 This eligibility
test is difficult to rationalize as a constitutional safeguard because, in
fifteen of the states that have a death penalty, guilt of the underlying
crime seemingly satisfies at least one statutory aggravating factor.73
69. 938 F.2d 1166 (lth Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 361 (1992).
70. Id. at 1183. The Deutscher court criticized this test, charging that it "offends the
Constitution and fails to comport with Supreme Court precedent." Deutscher v. Whitley, 946 F.2d
1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1991).
71. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
72. Id. at 2517.
73. The fifteen states to which this applies are Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Idaho,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Ohio, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and
Wyoming. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-39, 13A-5-40, 13A-5-47, 13A-5-49 (1982); ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 5-4-604, 5-10-101 (Michie 1987); DEL. CODE ArN. tit. 11, §§ 636, 4209 (1979); FLA.
STAT. chs. 775.082, 782.04, 921.141,921.142 (1992); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-4003, 18-4004, 19-2515
(1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30 (West 1992); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4 (West
1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 407-10, 412-13 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 97-3-19, 99-19-
101 (1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 630:1, 630:1-a, 630:5 (1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2903.01, 2929.04 (Anderson 1993); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 12.31, 19.02, 19.03 (West
1993); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 (West 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-206, 76-
3-207, 76-5-202, 76-5-203 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-31, 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4 (Michie
1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.32.030, 9A.32.040, 10.95.020, 10.95.030, 10.95.060,
10.95.070 (West 1990); WYo. STAT. §§ 6-2-101, 6-2-102 (1992).
The Texas and Virginia statutes differ slightly from the statutes of the other states in that they
define capital murder as a distinct crime. See TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (WEST 1993); VA
'CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (Michie 1990). In Texas, to impose the death sentence, the sentencer must
affirm that it considers the defendant a future threat to society. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071 (West 1993). In Virginia, the sentencer must affirm that it considers the defendant a future
threat to society, or that it considers the crime to have been performed in an outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman manner in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or
aggravated battery to the victim. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1990). As the State of
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More important, these states alone performed 75.49%74 of the execu-
tions since the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in Gregg v.
Georgia.75 Thus, once a jury in one of these fifteen states convicts the
defendant of a crime for which it can impose the death penalty, a federal
court cannot review the defendant's claims of constitutional error in an
abusive petition.76
This test effectively collapses the distinction between actual inno-
cence of the crime and actual innocence of the death penalty because in
three-quarters of the cases that end in capital punishment, once the jury
has found the petitioner guilty of the underlying capital crime, at least
one statutory aggravating factor is automatically present." Accordingly,
Texas successfully argued in Selvage v. Collins, 972 F.2d 101, 103 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993), any person convicted of capital murder under the statute is eligible for the
death penalty because the statute informs the jury's discretion without narrowing the class of
defendants eligible for the death penalty.
74. For a breakdown of the number and percentage of total executions performed by each
state since 1976, see Death Row, U.S.A., supra note 4, at 9.
75. 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 12-20.
76. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment is not violated
when the statutory aggravating factors duplicate the elements of a crime. Lowenfield v. Phelps,
484 U.S. 231, 233 (1988). More recently, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment requires a showing of distinct aggravating factors in addition to factors that duplicate
elements of the underlying crime when that crime is felony murder. State v. Middlebrooks, 840
S.W.2d 317, 323 (Tenn. 1992). The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
Tennessee v. Middlebrooks, 113 S. Ct. 1840 (1993).
77. For example, "a supported verdict of guilty of first degree murder in the guilt phase of the
trial automatically fulfills the threshold requirement of a finding of at least one statutory
aggravating circumstances [sic], thereby authorizing the jury to consider imposing the death
penalty." State v. Sawyer, 422 So. 2d 95, 101 n.12 (La. 1982), vacated in light of new authority,
sub nom. Sawyer v. Louisiana, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983), sentence reaffd in Sawyer v. State, 422 So.
2d 1138 (La. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Sawyer v. Louisiana, 466 U.S. 931 (1984) (construing
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 and LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4). Compare the statutory
schemes listed in supra note 73 with those in the following states, twenty-one of which have the
death penalty: Alaska Stat. § 12.55.125 (1992) (no death penalty); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
703, 13-1105 (1993); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 189, 190.2 (West Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 16-11-103, 18-3-102 (West 1980 & Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-46a,
53a-54b (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-2401, 22-2404 (1989) (no death
penalty); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1101, 27-2534.1 (Harrison 1988); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-701
(1988) (no death penalty); ILL. ANN. COMP. STAT. ch. 720, para. 51 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 35-42-1-1, 35-50-2-9 (West 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 707.2, 902.1 (West 1993)
(no death penalty); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-2401 to 62-2405 (1983) (repealed death penalty
statute); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507.020, 532.025 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §§ 201, 1251 (West 1983 & Supp. 1992) (no death penalty); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 265, §§ 1, 2 (West 1990) and ch. 279, §§ 68, 69 (West Supp. 1993); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.548 (Callaghan 1990) (no death penalty); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185 (West Supp.
1993) (no death penalty); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 565.020, 565.032 (Vernon Supp. 1993); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-102, 46-18-303, 46-18-304, 46-18-305 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-302,
28-303, 29-2520, 29-2522, 29-2523 (1989); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 200.030, 200.033, 200.035
(Michie 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:11-3 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-2-1, 31-
20A-2, 31-20A-4, 31-20A-5, 31-20A-6 (Michie 1984); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.06, 125.27
(McKinney 1992) (death penalty statute, § 60.06, found unconstitutional in People v. Smith, 468
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the petitioner is not innocent of death and the federal courts may decline
review on the merits.78 Therefore, a petitioner may be innocent of death
and receive review of an abusive habeas petition only if he is actually
innocent of the underlying offense.79
V. SA WYER V. WHITLEY
In Sawyer, the jury sentenced Robert Wayne Sawyer to death after
convicting him of the first degree murder of Frances Arwood, a young
woman staying in his home to care for the children of Sawyer's live-in
girlfriend.80 Sawyer and an accomplice battered, attempted to drown,
scalded, and burned the victim, leaving her to die.8"
At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence that Sawyer earlier
had pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter in the death of a four-
year-old child entrusted to his care; the child had died from a severe
blow to the head.82 That crime did not relate to the murder of Frances
N.E.2d 879 (N.Y. 1984)); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17, 15A-2000 (1986); N.D. CEr. CODE
§§ 12.1-16-01, 12.1-32-01 (1985) (no death penalty); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 691, 701.7,
701.9, 701.10, 701.12 (West 1992); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 163.095, 163.105, 163.115, 163.150
(1991); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1102, 2501, 2502 (1983 & Supp. 1992) and tit. 42,
§ 9711 (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-23-1, 11-23-2 (1992) (no death penalty); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-3-10, 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-6-1, 22-16-4, 23A-
27A-1 (Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-11-117, 39-13-202, 39-13-204 (1991); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 2301, 2303 (Supp. 1992) (no death penalty); W.VA. CODE §§ 61-2-1, 61-11-2
(1992) (no death penalty); WiS. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.50, 940.01 (West Supp. 1992).
The above states that authorize the death penalty, with the exception of Connecticut, define
murder generally and the statutory aggravating factors specifically. Some of these states, in
addition to defining murder generally, have a specific felony murder provision with a similar
aggravating factor; however, none of them have an aggravating factor that corresponds to the
general definition of murder. Accordingly, in these states, a supported verdict of guilty of murder
(a first degree felony) does not automatically fulfill the threshold requirement of a finding of at
least one statutory aggravating circumstance, as it does in those states listed supra note 73.
Although Connecticut does define murder specifically with similar aggravating circumstances, it
has no automatic upgrade because the existence of any mitigating factor precludes a sentence of
death.
78. Again, this analysis applies only to those states listed supra note 73.
79. This analysis assumes that the percentage of total executions performed by these states
will stay fairly constant.
80. State v. Sawyer, 422 So. 2d 95, 97 (La. 1982).
81. Id. at 98. Sawyer and an accomplice beat Frances Arwood with their fists, kicked her,
and dragged her by the hair into the bathroom. Id. There she was forcibly submerged in the
bathtub and scalded with boiling water before being dragged unconscious into the living room
where she was beaten with a belt and kicked repeatedly. Id. The accomplice raped Frances
Arwood once and possibly twice before Sawyer doused her with lighter fluid and set her on fire.
Id. at 98 nn.3-4. They left her unconscious in the living room for several hours before visiting
relatives discovered her and called the police. Id. at 98. She died several weeks later, never
having regained consciousness. See id. at 97. Sawyer's girlfriend and her two small children
witnessed the attack because Sawyer prevented them from leaving by locking the door and
keeping the key. Id. at 97-98.
82. Id. at 100.
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Arwood.
During the penalty phase of the trial, Sawyer's jury found three
statutory aggravating circumstances: (1) Sawyer was engaged in the
commission of an aggravated arson; (2) the offense was committed in an
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner; and (3) Sawyer previ-
ously had been convicted of an unrelated murder [the involuntary man-
slaughter].83  The jury found no mitigating circumstances.84  The
Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed Sawyer's death sentence on October
18, 1982.85
In 1986, Sawyer filed his first federal habeas petition; each of his
eighteen claims was denied on the merits.86 The habeas petition under
consideration in Sawyer v. Whitley87 was Sawyer's second. In this peti-
tion, he advanced two claims before the federal courts. First, Sawyer
maintained and presented affidavits stating that it was his accomplice,
not he, who burned the victim. 8  Sawyer further asserted that the police
violated his due process rights by failing to produce this exculpatory
evidence. 9 Second, Sawyer argued that his trial counsel was ineffective
because he had failed to introduce records of Sawyer's treatment in two
83. Sawyer, 422 So. 2d at 101. See supra note 68 for Louisiana's statutory aggravating
factors. On review, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the evidence did not support the
third aggravating circumstance because involuntary manslaughter is not murder. Id.
84. At the penalty phase, Sawyer testified that he had been intoxicated at the time of the
murder and claimed the defense of "toxic psychosis." Id. at 99. Sawyer's sister testified that
Sawyer had suffered a deprived and violent childhood, that he loved and cared for her children,
and that as a teenager Sawyer had undergone shock therapy while confined to a mental hospital.
Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2517 (1992); State v. Sawyer, 422 So. 2d 95, 100 (La. 1982).
Examples of a mitigating circumstance include lack of significant history of prior criminal
activity, the defendant's age, and the defendant's minimal participation in the crime. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(6) (Supp. 1992); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 905.5 (West 1992).
85. Sawyer, 422 So. 2d at 106.
86. See Sawyer v. Butler, 848 F.2d 582, 586 (5th Cir. 1988), affid on reh'g en banc, 881 F.2d
1273 (5th Cir. 1989).
87. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2518 (1992).
88. Much of the evidence [contained in the affidavits Sawyer presented to support his
abusive claim] goes to the credibility of [Sawyer's girlfriend], suggesting e.g., that
contrary to her testimony at trial she knew [Sawyer's accomplice] prior to the day
of the murder; that she was drinking the day before the murder; and that she testified
under a grant of immunity from the prosecutor. . . . The final bit of evidence
petitioner alleges was unconstitutionally kept from the jury due to a Brady violation
was a statement made by [the girlfriend's] then 4-year-old son, Wayne, to a police
officer the day after the murder [to the effect that it was the accomplice who had set
Frances Arwood on fire and that] "Daddy [Sawyer] tried to help the lady" and that
the "other man" had pushed Sawyer back into a chair.
Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2524.
89. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Court held that "the suppression by the
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution." Id. at 87. Accordingly, Sawyer asserted a Brady violation because the police
officer withheld the child's statement exculpating Sawyer. See supra note 88.
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mental health institutions.90
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Sawyer's failure to
assert the due process claim in his first petition constituted an abuse of
the writ for which he had not shown cause under the McCleskey test.9t
The Fifth Circuit further held that the ineffective assistance claim was
successive because it had been rejected on the merits in Sawyer's first
petition and that he failed to show cause for not bringing all evidence in
support of this claim in the first petition.9 Because Sawyer did not con-
test these findings on certiorari, the United States Supreme Court dis-
pensed with the cause and prejudice standard and moved to actual
innocence. 93 The Court questioned whether Sawyer had shown by clear
and convincing evidence that, but for the constitutional error, he would
have been ineligible for (was actually innocent of) the death penalty.94
A. The Majority Opinion by Justice Rehnquist
1. THE STANDARD OF PROOF
The clear and convincing evidence standard is a heightened stan-
dard of proof, falling somewhere between greater weight of the evidence
and beyond a reasonable doubt.95 It is used to prove medical facts in
cases of civil commitment,96 to prove actual malice in libel suits brought
by public officials,9 7 and in cases of deportation 98 and naturalization.99
The Sawyer majority concluded, without explanation, that it must apply
this standard. 1°°
90. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2523.
91. Sawyer v. Whitley, 945 F.2d 812, 824 (5th Cir. 1991), aftd, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
Sawyer could not show cause for the omission because the State did not impede his access to the
information and therefore did not frustrate his ability to raise the claim in his initial petition. Id.
92. Id. at 823. For a description of the difference between successive and abusive claims, see
supra text accompanying note 28.
93. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2523 (1992).
94. Id. at 2523. The innocent of death exception applies to both the abusive claim under
McCleskey v. Zant, 112 S. Ct. 1454 (1991), and the successive claim under Kuhlmann v. Wilson,
477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986) (applying the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to successive
petitions). The Supreme Court now equates this fundamental miscarriage of justice exception
with actual innocence of the death penalty. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
95. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 251 (6th ed. 1990).
96. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979).
97. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
98. Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1966).
99. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943).
100. Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2523 (1992). ("Therefore, we must determine if
petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no
reasonable juror would find him eligible for the death penalty under Louisiana law.").
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2. THE FACTORS THE FEDERAL COURTS MAY CONSIDER
In Sawyer, the majority held that in determining actual innocence a
federal court could consider only aggravating factors."°' This holding
vitiates Sawyer's claim that exclusion of the mitigating evidence show-
ing that it was not he who burned the victim presented the sentencer
with a "factually inaccurate sentencing profile."' 0 2 The Court concluded
that considering mitigating factors would relegate actual innocence to
actual prejudice, allowing petitioners to evade the cause prong of the
cause and prejudice exception.10 3 Yet, if the Court's concern is one of
actual innocence, why is it relevant whether cause for the omission
existed? The Court answers this question with a statement of policy:
If federal habeas review of capital sentences is to be at all rational,
petitioner must show something more in order for a court to reach the
merits of his claims on a successive [or abusive] habeas petition than
he would have had to show to obtain relief on his first habeas
petition. 'a
Moreover, the Court points to the difficulty a federal court would face in
assessing how jurors would have reacted to additional showings of miti-
gating factors, an inquiry that would expand what is supposed to be a
narrow exception to the principle of finality. 05
In effect, to allow the federal courts to consider the mitigating fac-
101. Id. at 2522.
102. Id. at 2521. This evidence also would tend to prove the absence of aggravated arson as an
aggravating circumstance. Sawyer also argued that inclusion of the involuntary manslaughter as
an aggravating circumstance contributed to this "factually inaccurate sentencing profile," which
may have prejudiced the jury. See supra note 83. The United States Supreme Court and the
Louisiana Supreme Court each found that at least two valid aggravating circumstances existed,
making Sawyer eligible for the death penalty. The two aggravating factors present were that the
defendant was engaged in the commission of aggravated arson and that the murder was committed
in an especially cruel, atrocious, and heinous manner. Id. at 2523; State v. Sawyer, 422 So. 2d 95,
101 (La. 1982).
The United States Supreme Court found that in view of all the other evidence in the record
the affidavit submitted with Sawyer's abusive, second petition "does not show that no rational
juror would find that petitioner committed both of the aggravating circumstances found by the
jury." Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2524. Moreover, "even crediting the information in the hearsay
affidavit, it cannot be said that no reasonable juror would have found, in light of all the evidence,
that petitioner was guilty of the aggravated arson for his participation under the Louisiana law of
principals." Id.
103. Id. at 2522 n.13.
104. Id. at 2522.
105. A federal district judge confronted with a claim of actual innocence may with
relative ease determine whether a submission . . . consists of credible,
noncumulative and admissible evidence negating [a necessary] element of [the
crime]. But it is a far more difficult task to assess how jurors would have reacted to
additional showings of mitigating factors, particularly considering the breadth of
those factors that a jury ... must be allowed to consider.
19931
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tors would force them to weigh evidence as if they were the original
triers of fact. The eligibility standard, conversely, is objective and effi-
cient.10 6 It clarifies innocence of death-an irrational concept that is
impossible to apply-by eviscerating it. The Sawyer Court conditions
actual innocence of the death penalty on a finding of actual innocence of
the underlying crime (or, as the Court states it, ineligibility for the death
sentence). The Court finds the innocent of the death penalty exception
sensible because the new eligibility standard allows a petitioner who
cannot show he is innocent of the capital crime to show an absence of
aggravating circumstances or some other condition of eligibility. 0 7 Yet,
as discussed above, absent actual innocence of the crime, a petitioner is
eligible for the death penalty and therefore not innocent of death as the
Sawyer Court defines it.'0 8 The two are inextricably yoked. It is, there-
fore, difficult to make sense of the innocent of death exception.
B. Justice Blackmun's Concurring Opinion
The difficulty in finding sensible meaning in the innocent of death
exception may result from the Court's incorporation of the fundamental
miscarriage of justice exception into the actual innocence exception.
These concepts are not equal. As Justice Blackmun emphasizes in his
concurrence, the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception focuses
on the preservation of constitutional rights, while the actual innocence
exception is a fact-based inquiry into the petitioner's innocence or guilt
of the underlying crime.109 Blackmun accuses the Court of being
"undaunted by its own illogic""II 0 when it extended the actual innocence
analysis to the sentencing phase, thereby replacing the fundamental mis-
carriage of justice exception and switching the inquiry from one of
106. Justice Rehnquist stresses that for the innocence of death concept to be "workable, it must
be subject to determination by relatively objective standards." Id. at 2520. See also infra note
146.
107. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2522. "Sensible meaning is given to the term 'innocent of the death
penalty' by allowing a showing in addition to innocence of the capital crime itself a showing [sic]
that there was no aggravating circumstance or that some other condition of eligibility had not been
met." Id.
108. Seventy-five percent of the persons executed since 1976 would have been automatically
foreclosed from federal court review of an abusive writ under Sawyer. See supra notes 73-76 and
accompanying text.
109. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2526 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Blackmun further iterates that
"the concern of a federal court in reviewing the validity of a conviction and death sentence on a
writ of habeas corpus is 'solely the question whether [the petitioner's] constitutional rights have
been preserved."' Id. at 2525-26 (quoting Justice Holmes in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 88
(1923)).
110. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2526 (Blackmun, J., concurring). As Blackmun discusses, the Court
in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), extended the concept to the penalty phase in capital
cases. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
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proper procedure to one of proper result. Most important, Blackmun
writes, contrary to what the focus on innocence assumes, accuracy and
reliability of the verdict are not the only values federal habeas review
seeks to protect."' 1 According to Blackmun, "[lthe Court's ongoing
struggle to give meaning to 'innocence of death' simply reflects the
inappropriateness of the inquiry." '12
Blackmun further argues that the Court suffers a skewed value sys-
tem that is more concerned with judicial economy, expediency, and
finality than with justice and human life.' 13 Blackmun closes his opin-
ion by reproaching the Court for its self-imposed constraints on federal
court review of constitutional claims by capital defendants; he charges
that this constraint "undermines the very legitimacy of capital punish-
ment itself."1 "4 Nonetheless, despite these admonishments, Blackmun
concurs. He has chosen result over procedure. In a footnote, however,
Blackmun explains that despite his disagreement with the prevailing
state of the innocent of death exception, he has and does attempt to faith-
fully apply it." 5
I 11. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2527 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("the focus on innocence assumes,
erroneously, that the only value worth protecting through federal habeas review is the accuracy
and reliability of the guilt determination.").
112. Id. at 2528.
113. Id. at 2529 (stating that the Court's having permitted McCleskey "to be executed without
ever hearing the merits of his claims starkly reveals the Court's skewed value system, in which
finality of judgment, conservation of state resources, and expediency of executions seem to
receive greater solicitude than justice and human life.").
114. Id. at 2530. Blackmun writes that in reviewing the state of the Court's capital case
decisions, he is "left to wonder how the ever-shrinking authority of the federal courts to reach and
redress constitutional errors affects the legitimacy of the death penalty itself." Id. at 2529-30.
115. Notwithstanding my view that the Court has erred in narrowing the concept of a
"fundamental miscarriage of justice" to cases of "actual innocence," I have
attempted faithfully to apply the "actual innocence" standard in prior cases .... I
therefore join Justice Stevens's analysis of the "actual innocence" standard and his
application of that standard to the facts of this case.
Id. at 2528 n.2 (citations omitted).
In addition, Blackmun joined in Justice Stevens's concurring opinion as well. Presumably,
Blackmun believes, as does Stevens, that even were the standard that Stevens proposes adopted,
the result in the case would be the same. Blackmun wrote a separate opinion to express his "ever-
growing skepticism that, with each new decision from this Court constricting the ability of the
federal courts to remedy constitutional errors, the death penalty really can be imposed fairly and in
accordance with the requirements of the Eighth Amendment [banning cruel and unusual punish-
ment]." Id. at 2525.
On February 22, 1994, Justice Blackmun, believing no death penalty can be constitutionally
imposed under the current death penalty scheme, announced that he will no longer apply death
penalty jurisprudence:
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. For
more than 20 years I have endeavored - indeed, I have struggled - along with a
majority of this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend
more than the mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather
than continue to coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has
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C. Justice Stevens's Concurring Opinion
Justice Stevens's concurrence, joined by Justices O'Connor and
Blackmun, takes a different approach. Stevens notes and challenges as
error the movement from fundamental miscarriage of justice to actual
innocence.'16 More important, however, Stevens sets this error aside
and focuses his analysis on the impropriety of both the "clear and con-
vincing evidence" and "eligibility for the death penalty" standards advo-
cated by the majority.1"7
1. 'THE STANDARD OF PROOF
In attacking the majority's use of the clear and convincing standard,
Justice Stevens tracks the development of the actual innocence excep-
tion from Carrier until the present and concludes that the Court has
"consistently required a defendant to show that the alleged constitutional
error has more likely than not [as opposed to clearly and convincingly]
created a fundamental miscarriage of justice."'1 8 Stevens argues that
this "more likely than not/probably resulted" standard is both familiar to
courts and objective, shows proper respect for finality in criminal pro-
ceedings, is consistent with the standard courts use to assess motions for
new trial based on newly discovered evidence, and is in tune with the
policy underlying the manifest miscarriage of justice exception. 1 9 He
been achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectu-
ally obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. It is
virtually self-evident to me now that no combination of procedural rules or substan-
tive regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional defi-
ciencies .... The problem is that the inevitability of factual, legal, and moral error
gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill some defendants, a system that
fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and reliable sentences of death required by the
Constitution.
Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari) (citations omitted); see also id. at 1130 n.2, 1138.
116. Stevens finds fault with the Court's decision, when "[charged with averting manifest
miscarriages of justice[,] ... [to] instead narrowly recast[ ] its duty as redressing cases of 'actual
innocence."' Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring).
117. Id. "[U]nder a proper interpretation of the Carrier analysis, the Court's definition of
'innocence of death' is plainly wrong because it disregards well-settled law-both the law of
habeas corpus and the law of capital punishment." Id. Stevens cites a number of cases he says
use the "more likely than not/probably resulted" standard of proof. See generally Coleman v.
Thompson, Il1 S. Ct. 2546 (1991); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S 288, 313 (1989); Dugger v. Adams,
489 U.S. 401, 412 (1989); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
118. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2531 (Stevens, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 2531-32.
Federal courts have long applied the "clearly erroneous" standard pursuant to Rule
52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and have done so "in civil contempt
actions, condemnation proceedings, copyright appeals. . . . forfeiture actions for
illegal activity" [and to review] nonguilt findings of fact made in criminal cases
pursuant to Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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asserts that this standard is similar to yet stricter than the "reasonable
probability" standard courts use to determine whether a petitioner meets
the prejudice prong of the cause and prejudice test. 120 Thus, Stevens
argues, this heightened level of proof appropriately confines federal
court review to the exceptional case in which the defendant can meet
this stricter standard of proof without imposing the "severe burden" of
the clear and convincing standard on the capital defendant. 2' Stevens
strikes the balance somewhere between reasonable probability, which is
more lenient, and clear and convincing, which is more stringent.
In support of his argument, Stevens cites the dual functions of a
standard of proof: (1) to allocate the risk of error between the litigants
and (2) to indicate to the trier of fact the relative importance society
attaches to the ultimate decision. 122 Stevens contends that the height-
ened standard of proof that the majority imposes furthers neither of these
considerations.1 23 First, he concludes, nothing supports the majority's
requirement that a federal court be virtually certain the sentencing
authority could not have sentenced the defendant to death "before
merely entertaining his claim."'124 Stevens points out that the innocence
of death exception determines only whether a federal court will reach
the merits of an abusive claim, not whether it will stay or vacate the
death sentence; thus, the state's interest in finality does not warrant the
majority's clear and convincing standard. 25 Second, Stevens argues
that the clear and convincing standard restricts federal review far more
than the "plain error" standard most states use to review defaulted
claims in capital cases. 126 Because an abusive writ raises issues never
before raised on a habeas petition in federal court, the clear and convinc-
ing standard-by making it harder to get review in the federal courts-
creates the anomaly of possibly leaving ultimate protection of federal
constitutional rights to state courts. The courts best suited to interpret
the Constitution may never hear these claims.
Next, Stevens attacks the majority's "perverse double standard"'127
requiring a non-capital defendant to show that constitutional error proba-
Id. at 2536, 2536 n.3 (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 2532.
121. Id. at 2532-33.
122. Id. at 2532 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)).
123. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2532 (Stevens, J., concurring).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2533. Stevens further argues that the clear and convincing standard unjustifiably
causes the risk of error to fall severely on the capital defendant, attaches greater importance to
protecting a defendant's sentence than to determining whether it is appropriate, and fails to
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bly resulted in a miscarriage of justice under Carrier while requiring a
capital defendant to present clear and convincing evidence that no rea-
sonable juror would have found him eligible for the death penalty under
Sawyer.2 ' More likely, however, rather than confining Sawyer to its
capital defendant facts, the federal courts will relegate all defendants to
the clear and convincing evidence standard. Accordingly, Stevens's
concern on this issue may be more imagined than real.
Finally, Stevens discusses the standard of proof he would employ:
To be innocent of the death sentence, a defendant must prove the sen-
tencer clearly erred in sentencing the defendant to death.' 29 This stan-
dard requires a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed."' 3 ° Stevens advocates this standard because it recognizes
both the aggravation and mitigation aspects of capital-punishment case
decisions:
It recognizes that in the extraordinary case, constitutional error may
have precluded consideration of mitigating circumstances so substan-
tial as to warrant a court's review of a defaulted, successive, or abu-
sive claim. It also recognizes that, again in the extraordinary case,
constitutional error may have inaccurately demonstrated aggravating
circumstances so substantial as to warrant review of a defendant's
claims. 13 1
The majority, however, accuses Stevens of wrenching the clearly
erroneous standard out of its context in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a), where it applies to findings of fact made at bench trials, but not
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2536. "[A] defendant is 'innocent of the death sentence' only if his capital
sentence is clearly erroneous." Stevens lists the following examples of when a capital sentence
would be clearly erroneous:
If, taking into account all of the available evidence, the sentencer lacked the legal
authority to impose such a sentence because, under state law, the defendant was not
eligible for the death penalty. Similarly, in the case of a "jury override," a death
sentence is clearly erroneous if, taking into account all of the evidence, the
evidentiary prerequisites for that override (as established by state law) were not met.
A death sentence is also clearly erroneous under a "balancing regime" if, in view of
all of the evidence, mitigating circumstances so far outweighed aggravating
circumstances that no reasonable sentencer would have imposed the death penalty.
Such a case might arise if constitutional error either precluded the defendant from
demonstrating that aggravating circumstances did not obtain or precluded the
sentencer's consideration of important mitigating evidence.
Id. (citations omitted).
130. Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum, 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). "The
standard is stringent: if the sentence is 'plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety' it is
not clearly erroneous 'even though (the court is] convinced that had it been sitting as the
[sentencer], it would have weighed the evidence differently."' Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2537
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).
131. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2536.
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jury trials.' 32 The majority further argues that a finding is clearly erro-
neous when the reviewing court is "left with the definite and firm con-
viction that a mistake has been committed," 13 3 not when "no reasonable
sentencer could have imposed the death penalty," as Stevens suggests.134
One would suspect, however, that just as Justice Stevens argues, a
reviewing court would be left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake had been committed by a sentencer that sentences a defendant to
death when no reasonable sentencer could have imposed that penalty.
Stevens opines that, because the clearly erroneous standard is the core of
the innocence of death exception, t 35 a defendant is actually innocent of a
clearly erroneous death sentence.
2. THE FACTORS THE FEDERAL COURTS MAY CONSIDER
Stevens criticizes the Court's decision, first, because it considers
only evidence concerning aggravating factors and second, because it
requires a petitioner to refute his eligibility for the death penalty. 36 Ste-
vens argues that such a narrow definition of innocent of death ignores
the rare case in which, even though the sentencing authority could sen-
tence a petitioner to death, such a sentence would be a fundamental mis-
carriage of justice.' 37 In effect, Stevens attempts to return the inquiry to
one of justice and fairness rather than innocence. "Fundamental fairness
is more than accuracy at trial; justice is more than guilt or innocence."' 138
a. The Majority's Refusal to Look at Mitigating Evidence
Stevens criticizes the majority's refusal to look at mitigating evi-
dence by citing two "bedrock principles" of capital-punishment case
132. Id. at 2522 n.14.
133. Id. (quoting United States Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395 (1948) and reaffirmed in Anderson,
470 U.S. at 573 (1985)).
134. Justice Rehnquist writes that the "no reasonable sentencer" standard traditionally is used
for review of jury verdicts. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2522 n.14.
135. Id. at 2537 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens declares that:
Just as a defendant who presses a defaulted, successive, or abusive claim and who
cannot show cause must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that he is
actually innocent of the offense, so a capital defendant who presses such a claim and
cannot show cause must demonstrate that it is more likely than not that his death
sentence was clearly erroneous.
Id.
136. Id. at 2533.
137. "This narrow definition of 'innocence of the death sentence' fails to recognize that, in rare
cases, even though a defendant is eligible for the death penalty, such a sentence may nonetheless
constitute a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Id. Stevens draws particular attention to the
majority's refusal to look at mitigating factors. He quotes Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393,
394 (1987), for the proposition that "'in capital cases, the sentencer may not refuse to consider or
be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating evidence."' Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2533.
138. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2530 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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law: first, narrowing the class of persons eligible for the death penalty
and second, broadening the scope of considered evidence.1 39 The major-
ity, he charges, respects only the first requirement while implicitly repu-
diating the second. 140 This repudiation conflicts with the theory
underlying capital-punishment jurisprudence: The non-arbitrariness of
the death penalty rests on individualized sentencing determinations.
1 41
Stevens analogizes the majority's definition of innocent of death to the
mandatory death penalty statute that the Court invalidated in Roberts v.
Louisiana42 because it looked only to the presence of aggravating fac-
tors without questioning the appropriateness of the death sentence for
the individual defendant. 43
Stevens argues that it is arbitrary to require the federal courts to
determine whether a reasonable juror would have found that statutory
aggravating circumstances existed, while refusing to let them consider
how a reasonable juror might have assessed mitigating evidence. '4  Ste-
vens maintains that both inquiries require the federal courts to reconsider
and anticipate a sentencer's decision. He argues that the same reasons
for barring consideration of mitigating circumstances apply to considera-
tion of aggravating factors as well.'
45
139. Id. at 2534.
140. "[T]he Court implicitly repudiates the [second] requirement that the sentencer be
allowed to consider all relevant mitigating evidence, a constitutive element of our Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence." Id.
141. Id.
142. 428 U.S. 325 (1976). See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
143. The Court's definition of "innocence of the death sentence" is like the statutory
scheme in Roberts: it focuses solely on whether the defendant is in a class eligible
for the death penalty and disregards the equally important question of whether
"death is the appropriate punishment in [the defendant's] specific case."
Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2535 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).
144. Id. at 2535 n.2; see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312 (1987) (stating that
"[t]he power to be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate."). In a more recent Supreme Court
case, Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993), Justice Thomas admonished that permitting
sentencing authorities to cite mitigating circumstances to avoid imposing the death sentence
returns the danger of discriminatory sentencing. "To withhold the death penalty out of sympathy
for a defendant who is a member of a favored group [the mentally ill] is no different from a
decision to impose the penalty on the basis of negative bias .. " Id. at 912. Justice Thomas's
words echo those of John Hart Ely, Stanford Law School Professor of Law:
It is by reducing, hardly by increasing, the discretion of juries, and thus to some
extent removing the buffers that ensure that people like us will never be executed,
that we move to protect those who are not so insulated from the sort of "unusual"
enforcement regime it is the point of the Eighth Amendment to preclude (and in the
process to provide political safeguards against excessive penalties).
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw 174 (1980).
145. [Consideration of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances] require[s] the
federal courts to reconsider and anticipate a sentencer's decision: by the Court's
own standard federal courts must determine whether a "reasonable juror would have
found" certain facts. Thus, the Court's reason for barring federal courts from
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Stevens's assessment, however, is faulty. The majority's inquiry is
one of fact.'46 Either the jury found that one of the statutory aggravating
factors existed, moving the defendant into the class of defendants eligi-
ble for the death penalty, or it did not. The reviewing federal court must
ask a very clear either/or question. As noted above,147 the inquiry is
entirely objective and quite efficient; introducing mitigating factors into
this analysis would skew its precision. The court would have to deter-
mine not merely whether mitigating factors existed, but also how much
weight they should be given. This in turn would compel the court to
consider the weight it must give aggravating factors (both statutory and
nonstatutory) 148 and to balance the two. The standard that Stevens advo-
cates would require a reviewing federal court to function in much the
same capacity as the state sentencing authority. The reviewing court
would have to decide roughly whether the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances enough to support the death sen-
tence. Accordingly, Stevens correctly argues that mitigating factors
should be considered to preserve the constitutionality of capital-punish-
ment jurisprudence; however, he incorrectly suggests that there is "no
difference between consideration of [statutory] aggravating and mit-
igating circumstances." 49
b. The Majority's Requirement That the Defendant Prove He Is
Ineligible for the Death Penalty
Stevens also takes exception with the majority's narrow focus on
considering mitigating circumstances applies equally to the standard that it
endorses. Its exclusion of mitigating evidence from consideration is therefore
wholly arbitrary.
Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2535 n.2.
146. Of course, the question whether a capital defendant is guilty of one of the statutory
aggravating circumstances is not an objective question of fact, but rather a subjective
determination to be made by the jury. For example, the jury was not bound to find that Sawyer
had committed aggravated arson. Nonetheless, once the jury determined that he had, the question
became one of fact for the reviewing court. In Sawyer, the question is not "should the jury have
found the defendant guilty of aggravated arson?" Rather, it is "did the jury find the defendant
guilty of aggravated arson?" As long as the alleged constitutional error does not implicate at least
one statutory aggravating factor found by the sentencing authority, the inquiry ends. Only when
the petitioner alleges constitutional error as to each statutory aggravating factor found by the
sentencing authority must the reviewing court go further, evaluating the proffered evidence in
light of all other evidence in the record, to determine whether absent the constitutional error no
rational juror would have found any statutory aggravating factor to exist. See supra note 8.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 106-07.
148. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
149. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2535 n.2. The factors differ because the reviewing court does not
evaluate the aggravating circumstances. It merely looks to see whether the sentencer found that
they are present or would have found they are present. See supra note 146. The reviewing court,
however, cannot rely on the mere presence of mitigating factors. If the reviewing court considers
both aggravating and mitigating factors, it has no choice but to weigh them.
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eligibility. 150 He argues that the majority's "all-or-nothing" standard is
unduly harsh. It fails to provide for cases in which the sentencer could
impose the death penalty, but to do so would constitute a manifest mis-
carriage of justice.1 51  Stevens emphasizes that when a sentencing
authority chooses between imprisonment and the death sentence, it must
look to the underlying facts and use reasoned moral judgment.' 52 By
limiting the inquiry to the factual presence of statutory aggravating fac-
tors, the majority's focus on eligibility ignores the need for, and use of,
this reasoned moral judgment.
Finally, Stevens applies his standard to the facts of Sawyer. After
conceding that Sawyer failed to show cause for not asserting his due
process claim in the first petition and that Sawyer is not actually inno-
cent of the underlying offense, Stevens concludes that the new evidence
does not demonstrate that the sentencer more likely than not clearly
erred when it sentenced Sawyer to death.' 53  Moreover, Stevens
acknowledges that even when courts have applied standards less restric-
tive than his, they rarely have found a defendant innocent of death and
reached the merits of an abusive claim.154 Stevens insists that "the
importance of making just decisions in the few cases that would fit
within this narrow exception" far outweighs any increased difficulty
between applying the clearly erroneous test and the eligibility test. 155 If
this standard prevents even one defendant from being put to death in
violation of his constitutional rights, the time the federal court takes to
review the claim indeed is "well spent."' 156
D. The Lower Court Applications of Sawyer v. Whitley
To date, four circuit courts of appeals and two district courts have
relied on Sawyer to bar review of abusive, successive, or procedurally
defaulted claims. 157 Once again, the appellate courts have split over
150. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2535.
151. Id.
152. Id. See also Weisberg, supra note 8, at 308:
The state's decision to kill is so serious, and the cost of error so high, that we feel
impelled to discipline the human power of the death sentence with rational legal
rules. Yet a judge or jury's decision to kill is an intensely moral, subjective matter
that seems to defy the designers of general formulas for legal decision.
See generally ELY, supra note 144, at 173-77.
153. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2537-38.
154. Id. at 2538 (citing Deutscher v. Whitley, 946 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991); Stokes v.
Armontrout, 893 F.2d 152, 156 (8th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Armontrout, 888 F.2d 530, 545 (8th Cir.
1989)).
155. Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2538.
156. Id. (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977)).
157. Clark v. Lewis, 1 F.3d 814 (9th Cir. 1993); Johnson v. Singletary, 991 F.2d 663 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2049 (1993); Deutscher v. Whitley, 991 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1993);
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what it means to be actually innocent of the death penalty. In Deutscher
v. Whitley, 58 the Ninth Circuit recently concluded that constitutional
error related to mitigating evidence may be considered under Sawyer. 59
The Ninth Circuit held that mitigating evidence withheld from the jury
because of counsel's incompetence could be considered in an inquiry
into innocence of the death penalty. 160  The court reached this result
because, under the applicable Nevada statutes, the death penalty could
not be imposed unless the jury found at least one aggravating circum-
stance and further found that no mitigating circumstances outweighed
the aggravating circumstance it had found.161 The Ninth Circuit refused
to reach the merits of Deutscher's claim, however, because he had failed
to show by clear and convincing evidence that but for the excluded evi-
dence, no reasonable juror would have found him eligible for the death
penalty.'
62
In Johnson v. Singletary,163 the Eleventh Circuit, citing Sawyer,
refused to consider mitigating evidence under Florida's statutory
scheme, which requires the original sentencer to weigh aggravating fac-
tors against mitigating factors."6 The Fourth165 and Fifth Circuits, 66
and two district CoUrtS, 1 6 7 also have refused to reweigh statutory aggra-
vating and mitigating factors where at least one statutory aggravating
factor remains.
VI. CONCLUSION
It appears that the Justices do not dispute the necessary demise of
the innocence of death concept. The Court agrees that it is irrational,
Montoya v. Collins, 988 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1993); Stamper v. Wright, No. 93-4000, 1993 WL
12492 (4th Cir. Jan. 19), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1069 (1993); Selvage v. Collins, 972 F.2d 101
(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993); Singleton v. Thigpen, 806 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.
Ala. 1992); Jones v. Murray, 802 F. Supp. 1412 (E.D. Va.), affd, 976 F.2d 169 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 27 (1992).
158. 991 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1993).
159. Id. at 607. The court in Deutscher held that "Sawyer requires the consideration of




162. Id. at 608. The Ninth Circuit further stated that "[wiere this Deutscher's first petition for
a writ of habeas corpus, we would be required to grant his petition. Unfortunately for Deutscher,
this is his second petition." Id. (citations omitted).
163. 991 F.2d 663 (11th Cir. 1993).
164. Id. at 666-67.
165. Stamper v. Wright, 985 F.2d 553 (4th Cir. 1993).
166. Montoya v. Collins, 988 F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir. 1993); Selvage v. Collins, 972 F.2d 101,
103 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2445 (1993).
167. Singleton v. Thigpen, 806 F. Supp. 936, 944-45 (S.D. Ala. 1992); Jones v. Murray, 802 F.
Supp. 1412, 1417-19 (E.D. Va.), afftd, 976 F.2d 169 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 27 (1992).
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illogical, and unworkable. The Court disagrees, however, over what
should replace the concept. The Rehnquist majority collapses actual
innocence of the death sentence into actual innocence of the underlying
crime by forcing a defendant to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he was ineligible for the death penalty. This approach is workable
because it is entirely objective. In addition, it rationally reassigns the
aura of blamelessness to the term innocent. If the defendant is guilty of
any statutory aggravating factor, then he is not innocent of death.
Unfortunately, however, Rehnquist's approach reaches too far. While
collapsing actual innocence of the crime and the penalty, the majority
crushed the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception as well, leav-
ing nothing in its stead. The majority foreclosed review of abusive
claims by a petitioner who cannot demonstrate by clear and convincing
evidence that he is actually innocent of the underlying crime. 68
Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor seek to revive the fundamental
miscarriage of justice exception. 69 Stevens persuasively argues that a
death sentence imposed in clear error, even though the defendant is not
actually innocent of the crime, is a fundamental miscarriage of justice to
be remedied by federal review.' 70 Blackmun reminds us that habeas
purports to protect individual rights, not simply to ensure accuracy of the
guilt or innocence determination.' 7' The concurrences correctly distin-
guish fundamental miscarriage of justice from actual innocence, proce-
dural protection from factual inquiry.
The breakdown of the innocence of death exception should not be
the breakdown of the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception.
Instead, it should spur the Court once again to ask whether the violation
of a petitioner's constitutional rights constitutes a fundamental miscar-
riage of justice-which should be the final, narrow protection for capital
defendants who bring abusive petitions.
DEBORAH J. GANDER
168. This result occurs in those states that have performed three-quarters of the executions
since 1976. See text accompanying supra note 73-75.
169. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2525, 2530 (1992).
170. Id. at 2530-31.
171. Id. at 2527-28.
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